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Abstract
An essential task of groups is to provide efficient solutions for the complex
problems they face. Indeed, considerable efforts have been devoted to the
question of collective decision-making related to problems involving a single
dominant feature. Here we introduce a quantitative formalism for finding the
optimal distribution of the group members competences in the more typical
case when the underlying problem is complex, i.e., multidimensional. Thus,
we consider teams that are aiming at obtaining the best possible answer to
a problem having a number of independent sub-problems. Our approach is
based on a generic scheme for the process of evaluating the proposed solutions
(i.e., negotiation). We demonstrate that the best performing groups have at
least one specialist for each sub-problem but a far less intuitive result is
that finding the optimal solution by the interacting group members requires
that the specialists also have some insight into the sub-problems beyond
their unique field(s). We present empirical results obtained by using a large-
scale database of citations being in good agreement with the above theory.
The framework we have developed can easily be adapted to a variety of
realistic situations since taking into account the weights of the sub-problems,
the opinions or the relations of the group is straightforward. Consequently,
our method can be used in several contexts, especially when the optimal
composition of a group of decision-makers is designed.
Keywords: Collective behavior, Decision-making, Interdisciplinary
research, Optimal decisions
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Highlights
• Quantitative formalism of complex collective decision-making scenarios
is proposed.
• We search for the optimal competence distribution of heterogeneous
agents.
• The best groups have at least one specialist for each sub-problem.
• The specialists have some insight into other sub-problems as well.
• Good agreement with empirical results obtained from large-scale cita-
tion database.
1. Introduction1
Addressing the process of collective decision making has represented a2
great scientific challenge for a long time [1, 2, 3, 4]. It is a highly relevant3
aspect of the behavior of social groups, in particular, because as it has been4
argued, measured and shown analytically: the “wisdom of crowds” can go5
qualitatively beyond that of the individuals’ [2].6
This statement also holds for animal assemblies [5, 6, 7]. A rarely con-7
sidered, but essential case is when the problem to be solved is complex, i.e.,8
has many facets. Under such conditions the quality of the collective solu-9
tion is highly influenced by the composition of the group. Obviously, if the10
members of the group are identical, the group’s performance can hardly go11
beyond that of any of its member’s. However, if the problem to be solved12
is complex – i.e., has a number of different aspects or “dimensions” [8] – a13
group having members specialized in their respective kinds of sub-problems14
is expected to be much more efficient in providing a high quality answer,15
than a uniform one. The stress is on the independent nature of the sub-16
problems, making the problem high-dimensional. In a way our present work17
can be considered as a quantitative approach to the problem of division of18
labor [9, 10] in the context of collective decision making (the task/labor is19
to bring about a decision; the division is made among the specialists of the20
sub-problems).21
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In spite of the above almost trivial observation regarding heterogeneous,22
diverse or “multidimensional” groups, a quantitative demonstration of its va-23
lidity needs a carefully constructed framework. Prior works involving quan-24
titative analysis have almost exclusively focused on problems that could be25
regarded as “one-dimensional” [2, 11, 12, 13] from our point of view which26
considers a problem having several dimensions (being multidimensional) if it27
can be broken down into sub-problems, each having its own characteristic fea-28
ture independent of those of the others’. In the case of one-dimensional prob-29
lems it has been demonstrated – using approaches from theory (see, eg., the30
pioneering works [11, 13]) through genetic optimization [13] to agent based31
modeling/simulations [14] and observations [15, 16] – that diverse groups can32
outperform homogeneous ones.33
Intuition suggests that a group of specialists (one competent person for34
each sub-problem) should be optimal regarding the quality of the solution35
with the constraint of minimizing costs at the same time. Here we present36
a generic agent-based approach which – due to its minimal assumptions –37
quantitatively demonstrates that the breadth of knowledge of its members38
makes a group more efficient, i.e., being capable of using a smaller amount of39
resources to produce a more beneficial solution in a wide variety of potential40
applications. This is what corresponds to the “synergy” resulting in a better41
decision relative to the one following from a simple “linear” aggregation of42
the proposed solutions. And what we show in our work is how this synergy43
can emerge from a negotiation process. Naturally, negotiation is absent (gen-44
erally) in animal societies. Specialization is the result of age or hormone level45
etc.46
Many opinion formation models exist in the contemporary literature,47
among which many considers ”heterogeneous” agents as well, often with48
continuous opinion values (For a review see [17]) However, agents in these49
studies are usually heterogeneous regarding their (i) confidence thresholds50
(or bounds of confidence, meaning that interacting agents adjust their opin-51
ions towards that of the others, but only if the two opinions are closer to52
each other than a certain threshold, a phenomenon closely related to the53
one called homophily), (ii) conviction, or (iii) influencing ability (aka. so-54
cial influence). In contrast, our agents are homogeneous with respect to the55
above mentioned characteristics, but they are heterogeneous regarding their56
abilities, and what is more, their entire spectrum of abilities.57
Other fundamental differences between the opinion formation models in58
contemporary literature and our approach include the followings:59
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• Most of them consider two-valued opinions (0/1, yes/no, etc.), moti-60
vated by the Ising-model. Their popularity is due to their simlicity,61
despite which they can lead to very deep results [18].62
• Most contemporary models assume a simple update rule: a (usually63
randomly selected) agent simply changes opinion ”suitably” to its neigh-64
bours. For example, if some neighbours of the selected agent share an65
opinion, the focal agent simply adopts it. In contrast, we detail the66
mechanism of ”convincing”: how it happens in iterative rounds with67
members evaluating the proposals of others and discussing it, all of68
which is affected by personal abilities.69
• Contemporary models usually consider entire societies (often even as-70
suming that N →∞), with mostly binary interactions. In contrast, we71
consider a relative small group (N ≈ 10), but with intense interaction,72
in which all members participate.73
• The aim of the above mention models is usually to gain an insight of74
the spread and dynamics of opinions, with emphasis on occurrent con-75
sensus or stalemate situations. In contrast, we aim to find the optimal76
composition of a group, regarding the characteristics of the members –77
in this case, (multidimensional) abilities.78
A paradigmatic example for our approach is that of a board of directors79
for a large company (however, there are many other possible examples rang-80
ing from a group of animals searching for resources up to a government or81
simply a team carrying out interdisciplinary research). In the case of a board82
of directors a potential candidate problem is that of finding the best possible83
placement and product for a new factory. Obviously, the various aspects of84
this problem are quite diverse, each of them requiring specific knowledge, i.e.,85
the decision involves knowledge of the history of the given country, various86
features of the labor force (education, etc.), geographical and logistic condi-87
tions, potential market in the region, and so on. It is an important feature88
of the situation that the members of the group cannot get any information89
about the quality of their propositions from an “outsider” who could know90
the optimal solution ab ovo.91
4
2. The model92
2.1. Formalizing interdisciplinary decision-making93
We have aimed at a model that is simple, but is still appropriate for94
projecting a wide class of realistic situations onto it. In order to do so, we95
consider groups of N individuals solving a problem P having M sub-problems96
Pj (j = 1, 2, ...,M) such that for addressing each sub-problem a unique (spe-97
cific) skill is needed. Referring to the company example introduced in 1, the98
board of directors counts N members, P is the problem of finding the best99
place for a new factory, having such sub-problems as: knowledge of: (P1) the100
law and taxation systems in the candidate countries, (P2) logistic conditions,101
(P3) local working culture and education, etc.102
Thus, we are dealing with a set of N×M abilities or levels/degrees of skill,103
Aij (i = 1, 2, ..., N), proportional to the ability/competence (e.g., accuracy)104
of an individual i to give the best answer for the jth sub-problem. We do105
not initially specify the Aij parameters: the method we apply (optimization106
with genetic algorithm) will result in their optimal values.107
Without losing the generality of the above setting, we assume that Aij-108
s take their values from the unit interval [0, 1]. The ability matrix Aij is109
also related to the costs involved in finding a solution (since acquiring a110
high ability to successfully address a sub-problem involves costs, such as111
experience, learning, etc.). It is obvious that the cost of obtaining an ability112
A is typically not a linear function of A, since achieving the capacity of perfect113
knowledge (A = 1) is much more costly than achieving a partial knowledge114
(e.g., A = 0.5). For the sake of simplicity we assume that the cost C for115
obtaining ability A, is116
C = f(A) = Const · Ax (1)
where 1 < x, and Const is a constant corresponding to the relative weights117
of the costs, when calculating the fitness of a group for given Aij-s. We start118
with a random distribution of the Aij values and search for their optimal119
distribution (by letting them evolve). Here optimal distribution means one120
which provides the best possible solution for the smallest possible – or for a121
given prefixed – cost.122
123
2.2. The stages of collective decision-making124
In our formal model, the process of collective decision-making is divided125
into four basic stages (See Chart 1).126
5
1. Each group member i suggests a solution for each sub-problem Pj in127
such a way that the quality of the given proposition Qij depends only128
on i’s corresponding ability, Aij. This assumption, in the simplest case129
means that130
Qij = Aij. (2)
In other words, we assume that specialists provide high-quality propo-131
sitions for their own field-of-expertise, while people without the know-132
how provide inefficient ones. (Adding noise to the above equation did133
not change our results.)134
2. During the “information diffusion” phase, members interact by evalu-135
ating each other’s proposals (each member evaluates all the proposi-136
tions). The evaluation made by member i′ regarding the quality Qij is137
denoted by Ei
′
ij and it is proportional to both Qij (the quality of that138
given proposal) and Ai′j (the savvy of i
′ for field j). The accuracy of139
such an evaluation is distorted by a stochastic factor representing that140
those members who have small abilities to evaluate a proposal tend to141
make mistakes in their appreciation with an amplitude involving ran-142
domness. These evaluations (Ei
′
ij) represent the central ingredient of143
our approach.144
3. These are next (in several rounds of an imaginary “round table dis-145
cussion”) modified by further interactions (communication/evaluation)146
with other group members, i′′, chosen with a probability proportional147
to their abilities concerning problem Pj, Ai′′j. The total number of ad-148
ditional evaluations in a given decision-making event is equal to X% of149
N . This step refers to the stage when somebody (most often, but not al-150
ways an expert of the given field) tries to convince other members of the151
group about her/his opinion by sharing her/his ideas. Characteristi-152
cally, 10, 20 or 30 % of the group can give an evaluation(remark/speech)153
for each subproblem.154
4. The quality of the solution for a given Pj is obtained by accepting the155
proposal of member i∗ receiving the highest average evaluation156
Emaxj = Ei∗j, (3)
where157
i∗ = argmaxiEij = argmaxiavgi′Ei
′
ij, (4)
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by the other members concerning his/her proposition for the solution158
of problem Pj i.e.,159
Qmaxj = Qi∗j = Ai∗j. (5)
The quality Q of the solution given for P – provided by the whole group160
– is then obtained by aggregating the proposals having the highest161
evaluations for the Pj-s after the last round.162
Note that the concrete problem (P ) is not specified (just an example163
is given). In addition, we have only two arbitrary parameters (the level of164
stochasticity, Rand, during the second evaluation step, plus the proportion of165
the evaluators X%, see also Chart 1. N and M are simple input parameters166
depending upon an actual situation. The description of the process may seem167
lengthy, however, it directly corresponds to our everyday practice during168
group decisions.169
From the algorithmic point of view, the input of the above described170
process (represented on Chart 1 is an Aij ability matrix, and its output is a171
fitness value F , by which we measure the ”decision making quality” of the172
group. F is calculated from the quality of the solution (Q) and from the cost173
of knowledge (C) needed to obtain such an answer (see Eq. 1) as174
F = Q− C (6)
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2.3. The flowchart of the model175
Start (Aij)
Where the indices are: i (from 1 to N) over the group
members, j (from 1 to M) over the sub-problems.
Each group member suggests a solution (proposal) for each sub-problem.
The quality Qij of the proposal submitted by individual i for sub-problem j,
depends on the ability/competence of individual in the simplest possible way:
Qij = Aij (we use different notation
because other assumptions can also be made within our approach)
Each group member evaluates all the Qij-s.
The evaluated (by member i′) quality of the proposal submitted by member i regarding
sub-problem j, Ei
′
ij depends on the ability value of member i
′:
Ei
′
ij = Qij ·Ai′j + (1−Ai′j) ·Rand,
where Rand is a random number from the (0, 1) interval.
Round table discussion: X% of the N members (i′′-s, having relatively high abilities)
present their evaluation of the prior evaluations so
that the next values of the Ei
′
ij-s become:
Ei
′
ij(t+ 1) = E
i′
ij(t) +
1
N (E
i′′
ij (t)− Ei
′
ij(t))
The quality of the solution for a given Pj is obtained by accepting the proposal
of member i∗ receiving the highest average evaluation Emaxj = Ei∗j by the other members
concerning his/her proposition for the solution of problem Pj i.e.,
Qmaxj = Ai∗j .
End (output)
Q, the overall quality of the solution (aggregated Qmaxj -s)
C, the cost involved (sum of f(Aij)-s)
F , the fitness of the group: F = Q− C
Chart 1: A simplified flow diagram of how the model works (the steps of a decision making
process). The flow diagram represents a single step (within each generation) during the
genetic optimization. For notations see the text. This chart gives a description of the
process through which the corresponding fitness (efficiency) value F is calculated based
on the given ability matrix (Aij-s). In the next step of the genetic algorithm these F -s
are used as weights based on which the “parents” of the new generation are chosen (after
the combination of two parents, random perturbations, “mutations” are applied before
finalizing the groups of the “young” generation).
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3. Methods176
We use a genetic algorithm [19] to find optimal solutions because this177
approach is known to be effective when extreme values for a function with a178
relatively large number of variables is being searched. Here relatively large179
means numbers above 8 − 10, i.e., we are looking for optima of a function180
which is defined in a high-dimensional space. In addition, (just like in the case181
of fitness landscapes or the free energy landscape for spin glasses and alike)182
our fitness function is likely to have a huge number of local maxima, and183
a single (or a class of) configuration(s) (sets of Aij-s with maximal fitness)184
corresponding to a global maximum. This is why we also integrate into our185
approach a technique analogous to the one called “simulated annealing” [20]186
used for finding the minima of the free energy in the case of problems from187
statistical mechanics. In our case this is realized by temporarily increasing188
the mutation rate when the actual solution seems to converge (stops changing189
as a function of the generation number). Even when applying this method,190
one cannot be sure that in the limit of a large number of generations the191
absolute optimum can be reached. Thus, usually a further, quite natural,192
and implicitly widely used approach is taken by assuming that the pseudo-193
global, optimal solutions possess the same statistical features.194
It is important to note that this approach (optimizing groups with genetic195
algorithm) is not related to the question of kin versus group selection in any196
way. Genetic algorithm in this context is purely an optimization method.197
For more details and parameters see the Appendix.198
4. Results199
4.1. Results from simulations200
The core of our results is summarized on Figure 1 C. On this, each column201
represents a sub-problem (specialty), each row refers to an individual, and202
the color in their intersection indicates the ability/knowledge of the given203
individual in the given field (See the corresponding colorbar on Fig. 1 D).204
As it can be seen, there is exactly one red square in each column, meaning205
that exactly one expert is needed for each sub-problem. Up to this point,206
our results pretty much overlap with the general intuition. What is less207
intuitive is that the rest of the squares are not homogeneously dark blue208
(corresponding to close-to-zero knowledge), but they are all shades of blue,209
meaning that in a group, optimal decision can be made if everybody has an210
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idea of some other people’s field-of-experts. We assume that this is due to211
better flow of information.212
In order to confront these results with the general intuition (holding that213
once a group has a specialist for all fields, no more ”extra knowledge” is214
required from other members) we have compared the optimality of the two215
types of groups: ”two-valued”, when an ability value can be either 0 or 1,216
and ”continuous” when the ability values can be anything between 0 and 1.217
Subsection 4.1.3 covers these results.218
Of course, the group members and their specialties are commutable in the219
sense that different runs of the same optimization method result in different220
layouts (Fig 2). However, as long as these two characteristics hold true (221
i) one specialist for each sub-field and ii) group members need to have at222
least some level of know-how in their mates’ field of experts) we consider223
the results as being the same. We discuss this question in more detail in224
subsection 4.1.2.225
Figure 1: Illustration of both the process (A,B) and the end result (C) of calculating the
optimal distribution of abilities/competences, Amaxij , using a genetic optimization method.
In (A) the generation number (G) dependence of the average fitness values (F ) of the
groups is plotted (red) for the fixed amount of cost, C = 0.3 (dark blue). The averaging is
made over a population size of 2000 groups. The corresponding diversity, D, is indicated
by the black line. The groups had N = 10 members and M = 14 sub-problems had to be
answered. In (B) we display the evolution of the relevant parameters when the optimization
is done with non-fixed ability cost C. (C) Displays the optimal ability matrix visualized
with colors – the scale being indicated in (D). These results are for a generic case into which
a few plausible assumptions are incorporated: the sub-problems have equal importance
(weight) and X = 30% of the members take role in the round-table discussion. The most
relevant message of (C) is that there is one specialist for each sub-problem (not necessarily
one person per sub-problem) and, perhaps rather intriguingly, the specialists are found
to have a clearly non-negligible competence concerning several of the other sub-problems.
If we add some cost for the case when a single person is a specialist of more than one
sub-problem, the solution ceases to have multiple specialties per person.
10
4.1.1. General properties226
In Fig. 1 we show results for Amaxij -s using equation 6, i.e., evaluating both227
the quality and the cost of the obtained Aij-s and considering the average of228
the entire population at the end of the evolutionary process. In most of the229
figures – in addition to visualizing the values of Amaxij – we also plot how the230
fitness F , the quality of the solution Q and the cost C changes as a function of231
the generation number G (as the population of groups evolves). In addition,232
we also display how the diversity D of the abilities depends on G. In all233
cases we find that the optimal distribution of the abilities is highly diverse.234
In all plots we use N = 10 and M = 14 without loss of generality (the235
main features of the optimal ability distribution do not differ qualitatively236
for different N and M pairs).237
Figure 1 demonstrates some relevant features of both the process (the238
progress of the genetic algorithm) and the outcome of optimizing the ability239
distribution. Random initial conditions correspond to relatively low fitness240
and high costs. The efficiency/fitness of a group quickly increases at the first241
stage of the optimization. An important observation is that higher fitness is242
accompanied by larger diversity values (D), which – after [21] – is calculated243
as244
D =
∑
i,j
((
max
i
Aij
)
− Aij
)
M · (N − 1) (7)
We have chosen this definition, because it differentiates among the diversity245
of distributions in a way being both in accord with the intuition and sen-246
sitive enough in the range determined by the actual distributions of Aij-s247
throughout the simulations.248
Our results come from simple and realistic assumptions regarding the249
“negotiation/discussion” process. Although the corresponding rules and cal-250
culations are not trivially transparent at all, nevertheless a relatively plau-251
sible interpretation for the main result can be provided. Perhaps the most252
essential step in our algorithm is the one when the group members, one after253
another, provide an evaluation of the proposals of the other members. If a254
member has zero ability to evaluate the proposal for a given sub-problem,255
then the contribution of this member to choosing the otherwise very good256
proposition becomes totally erratic (see the equation in Chart 1 for Ei
′
ij).257
Conversely, even a relatively small ability to estimate the right value of a258
proposal results in a decreased level of randomness in the evaluation and,259
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in this way, provides a more accurate estimated proposition quality. When260
the evaluations are aggregated to choose the best answer, the latter, more261
consistent contributions become to play an essential role.262
Figure 2: Visualization of the optimization for four different (random) initial conditions
and (stochastic) realizations. Although the individual ability distributions are different,
they correspond to about the same level of optimality which can be seen from the four
curves virtually overlapping in all cases. The wiggles around G = 2000 and G = 2500 are
due to the momentarily increased level of perturbations or “mutations” within the genetic
algorithm (in the spirit of simulated annealing, see Materials and methods). (D) displays
the development of the ability matrix as the genetic algorithm progresses. Here and in
one of the displays in (B) a combination of column heights and colors is used to visualize
the values of the ability matrix.
4.1.2. Robustness263
Next we investigate the robustness of the new results stemming from264
our approach by testing the method on a few specific conditions. First, we265
start the optimization from different initial conditions and check whether266
the results are consistent with each other (have the same overall features).267
Figure 2 shows two different directions of the comparison. In Fig. 2A we268
show how similarly the main quantities (A, D, F and Q) evolve during four269
(stochastically) independent optimization processes starting from different270
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random initial conditions and lead to rather different final configurations271
(presented in Fig. 2B). However, the essential features of the solutions are the272
same and the generation number (G) dependence of the above four quantities273
is also very similar. Figure 2D shows a number of frames from an imaginary274
movie visualizing how the ability matrix converges for growing G to its final275
state for a given set of initial abilities. Related movie files are included in276
the Appendix.277
4.1.3. Continuous vs. two-valued278
In Fig. 3 we display results obtained from an optimization of the ability279
matrix where the Aij values are, in the first case, arbitrary (continuous be-280
tween 0 and 1), while in the alternative case, either 1 (full competence) or 0281
(zero competence). In the two-valued case we expect that the trivial optimal282
solution is a group having 1 specialist for each sub-problem (the same mem-283
ber can be a specialist for more than 1 sub-problem, but we expect a single284
specialist per sub-problem). Such a solution would indeed be optimal if full285
knowledge was not too expensive and no discussion/evaluation took place.286
In reality this is not the case though since both the independent evaluation287
of an expert and the cost of hiring him/her are very high. This aspect of the288
problem can be accounted for by our cost function f(A).289
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Figure 3: (A) Best and (B) average performance (fitness) values as a function of G ob-
tained for the two fundamental variants for the possible Aij-s: one allowing any values
between 0 and one, while the second having only two possible (0 or 1) values. This is
an important test to demonstrate that the intuitive, trivial choice for the abilities of the
members, i.e., 1 corresponding to perfect competence while 0 corresponding to zero com-
petence (with regard to a given sub-problem) results in less efficient groups. The reason is
increased cost for Aij = 1 and the inefficient discussion phase (due to the presence of the
totally incompetent members). The average fitness of the 2000 groups in a generation is
significantly lower than that of the best performing ones in the binary case. The continu-
ous distribution is much less sensitive to random perturbations than the two-valued one,
the best and average performances are also very similar.
Indeed, we find for realistic situations (full special knowledge is expensive290
and discussion can improve finding the optimal solution) that our approach291
results in a multiple-valued ability distribution performing better than the292
one constructed only from the trivial 1 and 0 abilities. In short, our formalism293
can be used to find the appropriate strategy (choosing between hiring top294
specialists or implementing longer discussions). Through adding some cost295
for the length of the discussion phase, even the optimal discussion time can296
be determined.297
4.2. Results based on big data analysis298
The above results are also exemplified by a number of studies on col-299
laboration, especially on the creative groups formed by scientists working300
on solving increasingly complex problems. At a very recent meeting [22] on301
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interdisciplinary science it was concluded that productive interdisciplinary302
researchers have a deep knowledge of at least one field but also a working303
awareness of others. Or, in other words, during broad collaborations indi-304
viduals’ breadth is as important as depth of knowledge in collective decision-305
making. In fact, Uzzi and collaborators have shown using huge bibliographic306
data sets (see [22, 23]) that papers of high impact tend to be produced by307
larger collaborations involving a broader wealth of knowledge.308
It is highly non-trivial to test our theory against observations since the309
quantities we use are very rarely available. Still, an analysis based on a huge310
database (Web of Science - WoS [24]) provides “experimental” evidence sup-311
porting our main theoretical result. Our method to find evidence supporting312
the prediction(s) of our approach was based on a very motivating remark by313
P. Ball [25].314
To measure the effect of the heterogeneous ability distribution in solving315
a task by a group of individuals, we calculated the level of interdisciplinarity316
of scientific publications using the WoS database, where subject classes are317
assigned to each article, which in our view correspond to the different types of318
sub-tasks. We define the level of interdisciplinarity, IP , of a published paper319
by the Shannon entropy over the subject class distribution of the publications320
in its reference list[26]. More precisely, we collect all subject classes from the321
papers appearing among the references of the article (Sref(P)) and consider322
the distribution obtained, thus:323
IP = −
∑
s∈Sref(P)
ps ln ps, (8)
where ps denotes the probability of subject class s in the set of subject classes324
based on the papers in the reference Sref(P).325
Analogously, an author’s interdisciplinarity is related to the average en-326
tropy of the publications this author has:327
Ia = 〈IP〉P∈P(a), (9)
i.e., the higher entropy corresponds to a higher level of interdisciplinarity of328
an author. Here P(a) denotes the papers of author a. We use the publication329
entropy instead of the subject class of the author’s papers, since there can330
be authors who publish in a small number of different journals but can be331
still interdisciplinary. In other words, in calculating the heterogeneity of the332
authors’ abilities, the entropy of their publications has a higher resolution333
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and thus it provides a more accurate description of their interdisciplinarity.334
Finally, each paper is considered as a task, and the level of heterogeneity in335
the distribution of the authors’ ability is defined by the average interdisci-336
plinarity of the authors. Here we measure the success of solving the task by337
the number of citations the paper receives.338
First, we selected articles published in the years 1997-1999 separately339
(therefore we have three sets of papers) and calculated the entropy for each340
article. Author’s entropy was restricted to the papers published by them in341
the years considered (1997-1999), and only authors with at most 50 papers342
were considered to account for valuable contributions. Then we plot the343
citations of the papers as the function of the average entropy of their authors,344
limiting the results to papers having at least 3 and at most 50 authors. We345
expect highly interdisciplinary publications to show the effect of receiving346
high attention (and citations) only after some delay (around 10 years) to a347
higher extent than the less interdisciplinary ones. Therefore, for each of the348
four years, we considered citations from a single year with a delay of 9, 10349
and 11 years. Thus, we obtained nine data sets in total, describing papers350
being published from 3 different years and their citations calculated with 3351
different time delays. We then binned papers by their entropy in bins with352
0.1 width. Results are shown in Figure 4 (we ignored bins that had less than353
10 papers). As the lower and upper quartiles illustrate, for papers having354
high average author entropy, the citation distribution prefers higher values355
as well, which is also supported by the inset, where all 9 curves are shown.356
There is a clear trend towards more successful papers as the average author357
entropy increases.358
16
Figure 4: Relative success of papers written by collaborating interdisciplinary scientists.
Median citation number of the publications as a function of the average interdisciplinarity
of the corresponding authors (measured by the average entropy of each author’s publi-
cations – averaged over the authors), error bars denote lower and upper quartiles. Data
shows the median of nine trends (papers published between 1997 and 1999; for each year,
annual citation count is calculated 9, 10 and 11 years post-publication). Single trends
include only bins with at least 10 papers. Inset shows the different trends obtained by
the three publication years and three citation years. Only papers with number of authors
between 3 and 50 and authors with less than 50 publications have been considered.
5. Conclusions359
Our formalism allows its application to more specific cases corresponding360
to various actual situations. It is, in some sense, the equivalent of the “divi-361
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sion of labor” concept translated to the field of decision-making. It can be362
easily generalized to cases with various relative weights/influences assigned363
to the group members (depending, e.g., on their social status in an organiza-364
tion) when their assessment is considered. Additional future research could365
address further interesting questions such as, e.g., the optimal size of a group366
for a given number of sub-problems, the most reasonable time interval spent367
on discussions, the effect of “overlapping” problems, etc. Furthermore, the368
bilateral relations among the members of the group (which may be inter-369
preted as an underlying network) can play an important role in finding the370
best solution. However, the main goal of our present study, instead of demon-371
strating particular applications, has been to provide a general framework for372
further quantitative estimations of essential parameters during collective de-373
cision making concerning complex problems to be solved by multidimensional374
groups (as far as concerning the abilities of their members).375
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Appendix431
General presentation of the model432
On a technical level our approach can be described as optimum searching433
on a high-dimensional highly rugged surface. Thus it has two main compo-434
nents: the searching mechanism and the function defining the surface.435
For the optimum-seeking process we use a genetic algorithm enhanced436
with some simulated annealing-like features, which induce perturbations in437
the mutation rate to ensure the stability of the obtained result. An interesting438
feature of this approach is that it obtains results which are reachable and439
maintainable.440
The function defining the surface includes the modeling of the given real-441
life problem-class and the estimation of the goodness of the actual evaluated442
parameters based on the constructed group-dynamical mechanism. This is443
called the fitness function.444
Genetic Algorithm445
An altered version of the generic evolutionary algorithm is used to find446
the optimum of the fitness function. The ”individuals” of this evolutionary447
process are the groups modeled through the ability matrices (a 2d array448
consisting of a 1d array for each member of the group, resulting in an N×M449
matrix, where N is the number of members and M the number of sub-450
problems). Thus the population on which the evolution acts is a collection451
of groups (in our case the typical population size is K = 2000).452
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The twist in our approach appears when the random point mutations are453
applied. Usually a predefined number of abilities from the whole population454
are selected, and the mutation consists in randomly increasing or decreasing455
their values (within a mutation amplitude range). If the mutation probability456
is pm, the number of mutations457
nm = K ·N ·M · pm. (10)
But in our case the pm value is not entirely fixed, it can change from458
generation to generation. It has a predefined normal value pmn, which is its459
starting value as well. But if the difference between the averages of the fitness460
values in two adjacent 100 (or 500) generations is smaller than 0.1% (or 1%),461
then the normal mutation rate (pmn) is increased, and then annealed back462
to the original one (during 50 or 100 generations). This solution helps the463
algorithm to avoid being stuck in small local optima, and also ensures that464
the results acquired have high stability, and good resistance to small pertur-465
bations. Additionally the actual value used at each generation is defined by466
the following equation:467
pm = pmn · (1− F ), (11)
where F is the population average of the fitness value defined in the next468
section.469
After this step is ready, only the normalization is ahead (when it is not470
applied, the values of the abilities appear as cost in the fitness function): here471
the A matrices of each group from the emerging generation are normalized472
such that the473
avgi,j
(
c · Aeij
)
= avg, (12)
where avg is the predefined average value of the abilities.474
Fitness function475
A short description about a concrete realization of the fitness function is476
also included in the article, but the aim of this section is to present the most477
general form of it, underlining the generic mechanism of our approach, and478
also showing its relation to the concrete case analyzed in the simulations.479
Flowchart of the fitness function480
This function is in fact where the model of the problem-solving and481
solution-selection process is encoded in the whole process. The input val-482
ues are the ability matrix of a given group and the return value is a real483
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Start (Aij)
Where the indices are: i (from 1 to N) over the group
members, j (from 1 to M) over the sub-problems.
Each group member i suggests a solution (”proposal”) for each sub-problem,
such that, the quality of the proposal depends on Aij :
Qij = Fproposal (Aij)
Each group member evaluates all the Qij-s.
Ei
′
ij = Fevaluation (Qij , Ai′j)
Here i′ is the index representing the group member to whom the evaluation belongs.
The evaluation values (Ei
′
ij) are influenced by the speakers i
′′ (the number of speakers is
X% of the group members – the mechanism for selecting the speakers is described later):
Ei
′
ij(t+ 1) = Fdiscussion
(
Ei
′
ij(t),
(
Ei
′′
ij (t)− Ei
′
ij(t)
))
For each sub-problem j the solution of i∗ is accepted
by the group based on the evaluation:
Qmaxj = Qi∗j , where i
∗ = Fselection
(
Ei
′
ij(final)
)
End (F)
The fitness is the difference of the overall quality and cost:
F = Q− C, where Q = Faggregate
(
Qmaxj
)
, C = Fcost (Aij , X)
Chart 2: Flow diagram representing the generic fitness function.
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number representing the ”fitness” of this instance. As it can be seen in484
Chart 2, the function is totally described by giving the exact forms of the485
functions Fproposal, Fevaluation, Fdiscussion, Fselection, Faggregate and Fcost (all of486
them may include stochasticity as well).487
First each member of the group proposes a solution for each sub problem;488
these values are proportional to the members’ abilities regarding the given489
task. In the article we considered the simplest case, where the quality of the490
proposed solution (for problem j by member i, being Qij) is equal to the491
respective ability:492
Fproposal (Aij) = Aij. (13)
The equality ensures that the small ability values (those close to zero) do493
not originate from the possible noise introduced at this level.494
The next step follows: each member evaluates all the solutions which495
were given to each sub problem, in the article we use the equation described496
there:497
Fevaluation (Qij, Ai′j) = Qij · Ai′j + (1− Ai′j) ·Rand, (14)
where Rand is a uniform random number from the interval (0, 1).498
In step c, the discussion phase, X% of the group members (i′′) selected499
with probability proportional to their ability in the respective field share500
their evaluations with the others (i′), who change their own such values501
regarding the proposals of everybody (i) for each sub problem (j) based on502
this information:503
Fdiscussion
(
Ei
′
ij(t),
(
Ei
′′
ij (t)− Ei
′
ij(t)
))
= Ei
′
ij(t) +
1
N
(
Ei
′′
ij (t)− Ei
′
ij(t)
)
. (15)
So here the model supposes that everybody can be influenced in the504
same way by the current talker, and their opinions are changed so that the505
difference between their and the talkers opinion is reduced. (Note that the506
selection of the evaluators – speakers – happens proportionally to their ability507
values. This passage creates a situation in which the speakers are usually508
”experts” regarding the given sub-problem.)509
Then the evaluations of the members are aggregated. In our case it simply510
means that for each sub problem the proposition which received the highest511
average evaluation is accepted as the solution of the group (here no hierarchy512
coefficient is included):513
Fselection
(
Ei
′
ij(final), Hij
)
= maxi
(
sumi′E
i′
ij(final)
)
. (16)
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For calculating the final return value of the fitness function in the article514
the most simple and intuitive aggregation function is used:515
Faggregate
(
Qmaxj
)
= avgj
(
Qmaxj
)
. (17)
And in the simplest case (if the average ability cost does not have a pre-516
defined value contrarily this is just a constant change in the function values)517
C is simply a monotonous function of the ability values, but it could also518
include the time of decision making (which we assumed to be proportional to519
the number of talkers in the discussion phase) or other relevant parameters.520
The typical case of our approach uses521
Fcost (Aij, X) = avgi,j
(
c · Aeij
)
(18)
(with typical values c = 4, e = 4).522
Animation about the evolution of the ability matrix523
The animations reachable through the links present the evolution process524
of the ability matrix in two different but very similar realizations of the525
simulation using the parameter set used in the core article as well (in the526
first case the ability values are represented with colors, in the second case,527
with colors and bars). It can be nicely seen how the specialist for each sub-528
problem emerges from the rest of the group, and an optimal distribution529
wins.530
See S1 movie and S2 movie.531
Comparing the results for different ability cost coefficients and exponents532
In the case, when equation 18 holds, there are two independent param-533
eters, namely the c and e constants. We present in this part the effect of534
modifying these values.535
Firstly, we observed that the ratio of specialists in a group remained536
1
N
in every considered case, meaning that each sub-problem will have one537
specialist:538
M ·N
N
= M. (19)
(This result was stable within 1% of error range, where the small error539
could appear when the two groups – specialists and the rest – could not be540
separated perfectly.)541
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Secondly, we considered the average distance between the ability of the542
specialists (regarding the sub-field in which they are specialists), and the543
knowledge of the rest of the group. (This measure is in fact a synonym of544
the diversity presented in the method section of the main text). The results545
of this inquiry are presented in figure 5.546
Figure 5: Average distance of a specialist’s ability from the rest of the members’. For the
explanation of the parameters see the text.
This surface plot makes it clear, that as the cost of outstanding knowledge547
increases (as the e and c values get higher, the difference between the cost of548
0.5 and 1.0 ability values gets emphasized), the optimal difference between549
the specialist and the other members gets smaller.550
Clearly this is just an example from the huge range of possible uses of551
the model, and unforeseeable range of its applications.552
Another outcome of this approach (of changing the two parameters of553
the ability cost) shows the stability of the outcome, as the results in all554
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cases are very similar, and basically the difference between them is just the555
mean and standard deviation of the two peaks in the ability values histogram556
representing the specialists and the rest.557
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